This paper examines the effects of auctioning quota licenses when market power exists. The overall conclusion is that with oligopolistic markets, quotas, even when set optimally and with quota licenses auctioned off, areunlikely to dominate free trade. Moreover, auction quotas only strictly dominate giving away licenses which are competitively traded if the quota is quite restrictive.
INTRODUCTION
In this paper I examine the case for auction quotas when there is either a foreign or domestic oligopoly. A companion paper' deals with monopoly.
One of the most common criticisms of voluntary export restrictions (VERS) and the way that quotas are currently allocated is that they allow foreigners to reap the rents associated with the quantitative constraints. It has been suggested that auctioning import quotas would remedy this. It is claimed that: "this would leave the price support features of quotas intact but deliver the higher profits to the U.S. economy instead of abroad."2
In an article in Business Week, Alan Blinder argues that:
"Auctioning import rights is one of those marvelous policy innovations that create winners, but no losers, or, more precisely, no American losers. The big winner is obvious: the U.S. Treasury, "3 An article in Time magazine quotes C. Fred Bergsten as saying that:
"Quota auctions might bring in revenues as high as $7 billion a year .°P . Congressional Budget Office (CBO) memorandum5 estimates quota rents possible in 1987 to be between 3 and 7 billion dollars. It compares this to the Bergsten et al. (1987) estimate for the Institute for International Economics (lIE) of 9 billion. Part of the difference, 2.2 billion, in the estimates arises because the CBO does not include a YEA on automobiles while the lIE does. The remainder arises from differences in procedure. Both estimates assume perfect competition everywhere. Takacs (1987) points out that proposals to auction quotas have become increasingly frequent.S She states:
"Commissioners Ablondi and Leonard of the U.S. International Trade Commission (Itt) recommended auctioning sugar quota licenses in 1977. The ITC recommended 1 auctioning footwear quotas in 1985. studies by But bauer and Rosen (1985) and Lawrence and Litan (1985) suggested auctioning quotas and earmarking the funds for trade adjustment assistance."
Despite the importance of the issues involved, the intuition behind such statements and the procedure used in the estimates is based on models of perfect competition. In such models, the level of the quota determines the domestic price, and the difference between the domestic price and the world price determines the price of a license when auctioned. If the country is small, then the world price is given. If the country is large, then the world price does change with a quota. How the world price changes is determined by supply and demand conditions in the world market.
However, when markets are imperfectly competitive, this analysis may well be misleading. The reason is that in such environments, prices are chosen by producers, i.e. there is no supply curve and the response of producers to the constraint must be taken into account when determining the price of an auctioned license. For example, if the response of profit maximizing producers is to adjust their prices so that there is no benefit to be derived from owning a license to import, its auction price must be zero Therefore the question that needs to be addressed concerns the behavior of producers in response to quantitative constraints in such markets, and the impact of this om the price of a license. There has been relatively little work in this area. The work on the effects of quantitative restrictions in imperfectly competitive markets is linked to this question,° but to date, little analysis of what this might suggest about the price of a license seems to exist.' In this paper, I develop a series of sodels of oligopoly which begin to 2 address this issue. The models show how the way in which licenses are sold, demand conditions, and market structure influence the resulting price of a license. The results indicate that there is reason to expect that the price of a license may be much lower than that indicated by applying models of perfect competition. Thus, estimates such as those of the lIE and CBO may be far too large. Moreover, if no revenues are raised from auctioning quotas unless they are very restrictive, the profit shifting effect of such quotas, even when auctioned off, is unlikely to outweigh the loss in consumer surplus of such policies. For this reason, they tend to have adverse welfare consequences.
In Krishna (1988) it was shown that with a foreign monopoly the price of a license was likely to be zero. This was because with auction quotas the monopolist found it worthwhile to raise his price and thereby shift the demand for licenses inwards, until the price of a license reached zero. However, one might expect that with more foreign firms this would be less likely since such a policy would also shift demand towards the competing foreign fins. Thus. one might expect that if competition among firms is strong enough, the prices charged may not rise, so that the price of a license could be positive.
Competition in price with differentiated products is assuaed both for convenience, and because competition in price a la Bertrand is more intense than is competition in quantities'°. Even in this case, however, licenses receive a zero price unless the quota is quite restrictive. This is because the effect of competition from other firms does not outweigh the incentive to strategically affect the price of a license on the part of a firm.
A model of a foreign duopoly is analyzed in Section 2 to illustrate this result in a simple framework. Section 3 works out an oligopoly example which allows parametrization of several important factors such as the degree of 3 substitutability between foreign products, their own demand elasticity, and the number of foreign firms. This shows how such factors affect the desirability of auction quotas.
Section 4 considers the effect of imposing a quota on imports for the case of a home oligopoly and foreign competition. I consider both the case when foreign and domestic goods are substitutes for each other, as well as when they are complements. In Krishna (1988) it was shown that with a home monopoly and substitute goods, auctioning quota licenses creates an incentive for the home monopoly to raise its price which in turn raises the demand for both imports and their licenses, thereby creating a positive price for a license.
The same result tends to go through with more home firms despite the fact that an increase in price of a home firm also shifts demand towards other home firms which works against a price increase of the borne firm(s) When home and foreign goods are complements, and there is a home monopoly, it is shown in Krishna (1988) that licenses have a zero price. The same result tends to carry over with more home firms. These results are illustrated using simple duopoly models. The results are summarized in Table 1 .
Finally, in Section 5, I conclude by discussing the effects of having more firms at home and abroad, and directions for future research in this area. 4 2.
FOPEIGN DUOPOLY
In this section and the next I argue that even with many foreign firms, each with some market power, a quota on total imports implemented through the sale of licenses will tend to be welfare decreasing. The main results are: Proposition 1. Auctioning quotas will not raise revenues for the home government unless the quota is set significantly below the free trade level of imports. Slightly restrictive quotas will only raise import prices and therefore reduce welfare from the free trade level. This tends to make quotas, even when auctioned off and set at optimal levels, worse than free trade.
However, it is no worse to auction quotas than to impose a VER where quotas are given away. It is strictly better to auction quotas only if the quota is quite rstrictive.
In order to develop some intuition, I first analyze a model of foreign duopoly. For simplicity, assume that all foreign firms are identical, i.e., impose symmetry. Let D1(p',pt) and D2(p1,p2) be the demand functions facing the two foreign firms. As usual, we will let subscripts denote partial derivatives and assume that D' > 0 for i I j and D' < 0 for i j so that demand is downward sloping and foreign goods are substitutes for each other. Marginal costs of production are assumed to be constant at c for all firms.
In the absence of any quotas, each firm maximizes its profits, 111 (p1 ,p2) = (p'-dD' (p1,p2) taking p3, i I j as given. The resulting first order condition, flt(pt,p2J = 0, defines the best response of each firs for any price by its competitors. B1(p2) and 8(p') denote these best responses for the two firms. They are depicted in Figure 1 The licenses are sold in a competitive market to either competitive domestic retailers with zero marginal costs of retailing or to consumers directly. I assume that the timing of moves is as follows. First, the then the demand for licenses must be the same as the demand for imports at Cp'+t,pt+I.1), namely D'(pl+L,pt+L) + Dt(pt+L,pz+L). quota. Then the firms set their prices. Finally, the clears. This timing is consistent with the idea that the clears more frequently than the monopolist sets prices, and sets the quota even less frequently than the monopolist that other assumptions about the market structure in the can be made, and future work is planned in this direction. then solved backwards as usual. Consider the market for the prices charged by the firms are (p',p') and the price then L(pt ,p2,V) 0 as defined so far. However, since a quota is not binding if such a high price is charged, L() is defined to be zero in this case.
is decreasing in all its arguments so that L1(•) 0, L() ( 0, L(•) < 0. This implies that the combinations of p1 and p2 such that the license price is just equal to zero is given by a downward sloping line in Figure 1 . This is depicted by the line L(p',p2,V') = 0 when the quota is set at the free trade level. Naturally, this line goes through the Nash equilibrium point (pl*,p2*). For prices above and to the right of this line, prices are so high that the quota is not binding and a license has no value. For prices below and to the left of this line, the quota is binding so that the price of a license is positive.
Moving to the second stage, each firm's profit function is also altered by the quota. Consider firm 1. Assume that D' 1.) + D1 C.) < 0; that is, the effect of all prices rising
Recalling that profits are given by II' C.) below the line L (pt ,pZ,VF) = 0, and by fl't.) above the line, this means that the conposite profit function facing firm 1 with a quota, denoted by flt (.) , must look like that depicted in Figure 2 (a), (b) and Cc) in these three cases.
(FIGURE 2 here)
Assume that both I1'(•) and fl'() are concave in p' given p2. Let g (p2) maximize ii' (•) with respect to p'. If we draw N C.) and 112 (.) as in Figure 2 . it is obvious that in case (a) it is best for firm 1 to price along 31(p2), in case (b) to price along LC•) = 0, and in case (c) to price along 3'(p2)
Returning to Figure 1 . the fact that $1' C.) N C.) means that B'(p2)
lies to the right of B'(pz) as shown. Similarly, B2(p1) lies above B2(p'). Let their intersection be at (pt,p2). The effect of the quota system on the best response of firm 1 is now apparent. Let B' (pt) intersect L() when p2 = p2 and i2(pt) intersect L(•) when p' = p' as depicted. If p2 exceeds p2* then both B'(•) and i'(•) lie above L(') = 0, so that fl'(-) and WI.) are both positive along L(•) = 0. Hence, we are in case (a). When p2 lies between p2 and p, we are in case (b), and when p2 lies below p' we are in case Cc). Therefore, the best response function for firm 1 given the quota is B'(p') which is drawn as a dark line in Figure 1 .11
Analogous arguments show that for firs 2 the best response function is given by B2(p') depicted by the dark dotted line in Figure 1 . Notice that the equilibrium is not affected when a quota at the free trade level is imposed. Since the equilibrium lies along L(•) • 0 selling licenses does not raise revenues.
Another way of understanding why the free trade equilibrium remains the 8 equilibrium is to note that given the price of the other firm, the quota makes the demand curve facing a firm more inelastic whenever the quota binds, and leaves it unaffected otherwise. However if p2 = p2k, the quota binds only if pt pl* so that demand is more inelastic for price decreases but not for price increases. Thus, there is no incentive to change price from p1* Similarly, firm 2 also has no incentive to change its price from p2 so that these original prices constitute a Nash equilibrium even with the imposition of the quota at the free trade level.
Now consider the effect of reducing the quota. This shifts L() = 0 outwards. Corresponding to this quota are B' (.) and 32 (.) analogous to those drawn in Figure 1 . Figure 3 shows the effect of the lower quota on firts reaction functions. It is easy to verify that this quota does affect the equilibrium.'2 In fact, there are a continuum of equilibria along the segment EF of L() = 0 in Figure 3 . However, all the equilibria correspond to L() = 0 so that even if the quota is slightly restrictive, the license has no value in equilibrium.
(FIGURE 3 here)
Finally, if V is so small that the Ia(s) = 0 line lies above the intersection of the B1() and lines defined by that V, then the equilibrium is unique, and is given by the intersection of 31(.) and jZ(.)*3 Again this comes from deriving B'() and D(•) by comparing the derivatives of fl(s) and fl(S) along Id) = 0. In this case, as prices are such that the quota binds in equilibrium, the licenses raise positive revenues.
However, this occurs only when the quota is quite restrictive. In this event, the consumer surplus loss is large so that the optimal quota level when licenses are auctioned need not be a restrictive one since welfare first falls 9 and only then rises as the quota falls.'4 Xrugman and Belpman (1988) , in studying the effects of a VER or quota with foreign duoply, show that for a linear example it is never optimal to set a restrictive quota.
A simple example is developed in the next section in order to better understand how market structure and demand conditions affect the welfare comsequences of such quotas. 
AN ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE
The effects of the quota system as described in the previous section depend on substitutability between products, overall demand elasticity for the product group, and the number of firms in the market. The following example illustrates the influence of these parameters. The main results are summarized in Proposition 2.
Proposition 2. In the CES/CED formulation used below, the ratio of the free trade level of imports to the quota at which the license price becomes positive. V, is given by:
As the number of firms, n. or substitutability between their products, a, becomes infinite, this goes to 1 and the results approach those of the competitive case. Moreover, for this parametrization, auction quotas always reduce welfare below its free trade level.
Demand arises from utility maximization with the utility function given and ado,-). The consumption of the numeraire good is denoted by N in the utility function. This parametrization draws attention to the crucial parameters, the substitutability between goods as given by a, and the demand elasticity for the aggregate good as caputed by a.
Since demand is for services produced, the demand for a particular variety of the good is a derived demand, derived from the demand for services.
Because services are in essence produced by the consumer, the price of a service, P, equals the cost of production. Hence,
The demand for a particular variety is given by:
where D(') is the demand for services, and a' C.) is the unit input coefficient, i.e.. it is the amount of variety i needed to make a unit of services given the prices of these varieties, The derivative of •() with respect to p' is at(') by Shephard's lemma.
The specification chosen, along with utility maximization yields:
The elasticity of demand for services, t,
is thus a constant and equals
The key parameters of the model are a, c, and n. Assume that each variety is produced at a common marginal cost, c. The profits of the itb firm are given by: 
if the quota hinds, and by zero if it does not. Therefore, if p is charged by all firms in the symmetric equilibrium, while pY CV) is the price needed for total demand to equal the quota, the license price is given by:
If the quota is binding, then each firm •aximizes:
This gives the first order condition:
x'(l -(p + ee') ] + (Ii(p' -
The second term enters because of the effect of a change in a firm's price on the price of licenses. It is convenient to rewrite the second term of (4) as: (3). Thus p'(V) is the equilibrium price with a quota at V.
We are interested, among other things, in the question of how restrictive the quota has to be for a license price to become positive. In Section 2 we showed that this corresponds to the quota being set so that it is just binding at the symmetric equilibrium assuming that the constraint is binding, i.e. set at demand when p solves (5) with L() 0 14 Solving for p in (5) with L(•) = 0 gives: -t pt = cca(n-1)) , and Vt (pa) (6) c(n-l)-n Thus, the ratio of the free trade level of imports, V', to the quota at which the license price is positive is:
Notice that r exceeds p', so that V' exceeds Vt, and that as n -) -,
As the number of firms or substitutability between their products Vt becomes infinite, competition becomes intense and we aproach the results of the competitive case.
yr
In order to get some idea of the magnitude of -, consider its value Vt for a = 2, a = 2, n = 4. Rere it equals (1.5)2, so that imports must be more than halved in order to make the license price positive.1? If auction quotas do not raise revenue, they must reduce welfare as they further restrict consumption without shifting profits. Since welfare falls as V is reduced from VT to Vt. and only rises after that, even optimally set auction quotas are unlikely to raise welfare. In fact, for the example developed here, auction quotas can never raise welfare. An outline of the proof follows.
Welfare under free trade, W', is given by; is the equilibrium price charged by a firm, when the quota is V. The price consumers pay for x is P*(V) + [dO), so that the first term in V is consumer surplus, while the second is license revenues.
Since xv = aSV • we know that naP* (V) = p*S (V), and the price charged by producers for a service is naI1(•) = 1/(), the implicit price of a license to import a service. Also, Recall that P*(V) was defined by (5) when L(') was defined by (1).
Using (5) gives:
(p*(%t) + I()) = a(n_l)(P*(V) -C). 
DUOPOLY AT HOME
In the previous sections we considered the effect of the quota system on the price of licenses when there were many foreign firms. Here we see what happens when there is foreign competitive supply but market power on the part of hone firms. The case of duopoly is considered for convenience here, the main results are summarized in Proposition 3. Proposition 3. With home duopoly and foreign competitive supply, a license has a positive price in the pure strategy equilibrium if home and foreign goods are substitutes and the quota is at or close to the free trade level. If they are complements, a license has a zero price. In either case, such a quota system is unlikely to raise welfare.
In Krishna (1988) it was shown that with a home monopoly and foreign conpetitive supply, a license has a positive price when the hone and foreign goods are substitutes and the quota is close to the free trade level. However, because of the absence of profit shifting effects and because prices to consumers rise, there is only a dead weight loss from such policies. When goods are complements, a license has zero price. Again, quotas are welfare decreasing. it is worth asking whether similar results would be obtained when a home firm has competitors who are also unrestricted by a quota and have market power.
4.1
The Model
Consider a market in which differentiated products are sold. There are two firms with market power which are not subject to a quota, which I call home firms.11 Let (p',p2) be the prices of the home firms, and p* be the price of the competitive foreign firms who make a homogeneous product. All firms 18 have identical constant marginal costs of production, C. The home firms make products which differ both from each other and from the goods produced by the foreign firms. The case of symmetric firms will be considered here in order to focus on the effects of the quota system. D' (p' ,p2 ,p*), 0 (p1 ,p ,p*) and D*(pl,pZ,p*) are the demands facing the two home firms and the foreign firms.
Since the foreign firms are competitive. p = C.
In the absence of any quotas the home firms maximize profits, D' (p' ,p2,C)(pt -C) for i = 1.2 by choosing p' * taking as given pi, j i, and C.1 This results in two best response functions, B' (p21C) and 82 (p' ,C) whose intersection gives the Nash equilibrium N as shown in Figure   5 . These equilibrium prices are labeled (p1N,ptN). D*(pl,pZII,C) 0"
gives the level of imports under free trade.
(FIGURE 5 here)
Effect of a Quota
Now consider the effects of a quota on imports at the free trade level so that V = D*F. The case when imports and domestic goods are substitutes is discussed first. As usual, the market for licenses determines their price; this market clears when:
The license price is then implicitly defined by this to be Nax(O,L(p',p',V)]
where V is the level of the quota.
Notice that L(') is increasing in pl and p2 but decreasing in V.
Raising the price of substitutes for imports shifts the demand for imports (and Similar arguments for firm 2 give its best response function B'N).
Again, B2N) is not drawn for p1 in between ' and p" but is given by 21. the dark line in the other intervals. Since both fli (.) and fl2 (•) are nonconcave, there can be a number of mixed strategy equilibria. However, only one pure strategy equilibrium exists; this occurs at E, the intersection of '(') and
Since E lies above the D*(.) = DIF line, the price of a license must be positive in equilibrium." 4.4
Welfare
The fact that selling licenses raises revenues does not, however, mean that this policy leads to an improvement in welfare. Because the foreign supply is competitive, the quota system does not shift profits, so that the gain in revenue comes at the expense of consumer surplus. A quota thus results in a dead weight loss, despite the positive license price and revenue thereby derived. This argument is made a bit more formally in what follows.
Assuming the existence of a numeraire good and an aggregate consumer who gets all profits and license revenues, welfare is:
where x',x2 and xt are the consumption levels of the two home and one foreign good. The first term in brackets gives consumer surplus, the second and third give profits of the two home firms, and the last gives license revenues. License revenues are a transfer from consumers to the government, and thus net out of welfare, as do the revenues of the domestic firms, which equal consumer expenditure, Thus:
As u and u equal the price consumers pay by utility maximization, and since this exceeds C, the first two terms will reduce welfare if a quota reduces the consumption of the home goods, since the home firms' market power 22 means that too little is being consumed to begin with. Furthermore, ii equals C + L by utility maximization. Also, as the quota is it the free trade level, dx* = 0. A quota at the free trade level therefore reduces welfare if consumption of both home goods falls. As the consumption of imports remains constant, and the price to consumers of all goods has risen, this drop in consumption of the home good is to be expected.
Finally, it is worth noting the effect of a quota set close to the free trade level. It is easy to see that by continuity arguments a slightly restrictive quota has similar effects on prices and welfare as a quota at the free trade level."
Complements versus Substitutes
One might ask whether licenses command a positive price in equilibrium when the domestic products are complements for the imported good. In Krishna (1988) , it was shown that with home monopoly and complementarity between the home good and imports, the price of licenses was zero. It is easy to see that the same result is obtained with more hone firms.
Suppose that the quota is set at the free trade level. The price of a license is again implicitly defined as before by L(p',p',V). However, 14•).
is decreasing in p' and p2 as the goods are complements. 14') is also decreasing in V. As before, the line along which the license price just equals zero is downward sloping in the (p',pZ} space. However, with complementarity, the license price is positive below and to the left of this line and is zero at points above and to the right of this line. It should be clear by now that this case can be analyzed exactly as was the case of foreign duopoly and home competition with substitute goods. Again, Figure 2 represents the three possible cases and Figure 1 the equilibrium with and without a quota at the free trade level.22 If the quota is set below the free trade level, then the line such that the license price is just zero moves outward as higher domestic prices lead to lower demand for the complementary import. This quota level in turn gives rise to best response functions analogous to those for the case of a quota with foreign duopoly and home competition. Figure 3 therefore depicts the best response functions. Again, any point between Er is an equilibrium, and at all of these points the license price is zero. If the quota is set below the free trade level, then it has no effect. When the quota is set at the free trade level, the license price remains zero, and the quota does not change welfare. Quotas set below this level tend to reduce welfare because of the absence of any profit shifting effects. In essence, the loss to consumers outweighs the sum of the gains to home producers and the license revenue raised. 
CONCLUSION
The previous sections analyzed the effects of a quota auction system for both competitive home and foreign supply, and duopoly or oligopoly abroad or at home. The main conclusion was that even when licenses do bring in revenues.
welfare is likely to fall. A final case to consider is that of one home and one foreign firm. Even here, the incentive exists for the firms to appropriate license rents by raising their prices. The domestic firm can increase the demand for the foreign product by raising its price. This causes the quota to bind, which makes the demand function for the domestic firm less elastic for price increases. There is thus an incentive for the domestic firm to raise its price. This in turn makes it optimal for the foreign firm to raise its price when the goods are substitutes since an increase in the domestic price shifts out demand for the foreign good. Because a quantitative constraint acts like a capacity constraint on the foreign firs, there is no pure strategy equilibrium in the game with a quantitative constraint. See Krishna (1984) •for a more detailed analysis.
The absence of pure strategy equilibria in such games has been known since the time of Edgeworth's classic criticism of Bertrand. The mixed strategy equilibrium involves the domestic and foreign fins charging prices such that demand for the foreign fir. exceeds the level of the constraint with a non-zero probability. In this event, a license is valuable and for this reason, the price of a license, even when the quota is set at the free trade level, is positive. However, as the level of the quantative constraint falls.
the equilbrium prices charged tend to rise so that there seems to be no reason to expect the price of a license to rise as the constraint becomes •ore 25 restrictive.
Thus, with substitute goods, the price of a license may veil be positive even when the constraint is set above the tree trade level, and may not even be related to the restrictiveness of the constraint! When the foreign and domestic goods are complements, the effects of a quantitative constraint are quite different. The domestic firm can make the constraint bind on the foreign firm by charging a low price. This raises the demand for the foreign firm above the level of the constraint and thereby raises the effective price of the foreign good, which is what enters the domestic demand function when there is excess demand for imports. However, this does not benefit the domestic firm since the goods are complements. For this reason, the domestic firm chooses not to try and make the quota bind strictly on the foreign firm. A quantitative constraint on the foreign firm thus leads to a pure strategy equilibrium in which prices charged are such that the demand for the foreign product exactly equals the level of the constraint.
For this reason, the price of a license is zero, even when the constraint is set below the level of imports under free trade. These ideas are formalized in Krishna (1987) The price of a license under duopoly is therefore zero when goods are complements, and positive when goods are substitutes. In addition, the price of a license in the latter case need not depend upon how restrictive the quantitative constraint is since the equilibrium prices also tend to rise as the quota is made more restrictive. Welfare is unlikely to rise in either case.
While simple models such as these help illustrate why auctioning quotas may not raise much revenue in imperfectly competitive markets, it would be 26 useful for policy purposes to determine empirically the welfare consequences of such schemes. Recent studies by Dixit (1985) , Venables and Smith (19B6) , and Krugman (1986) on computable partial equilibrium models hold much promise, and work on this front is under way.
Another area where work is needed concerns the determinants of market structure in the market for licenses itself. In this paper I assume this market is competitive. It is worth exploring when this is likely to occur, when there will be incentives for agents to cartelize this market, and who will have the greatest incentive to do so.
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FOOTNOTES
l.See Krishna (1988) , "The Case of the 6.The interested reader should consult Bergsten ct al. (1987) and Takacs (1987) for a historical and institutional perspective of work in this area.
7.See Takacs (1987) , footnote 7.
8.See Krishna (1987) for a survey of this work. In particular, Krishna (1984) and Krugman and Helpman (1988) on quotas and VERS with oligopoly are related to the question of the effects of auctioning quotas with oligopoly.
9.Krugunan and Helpman (1988) , chapter 4, contains a linear example of the model presented in the next section. Krugman and Relpman work through a linear example using marginal revenue and cost curves to study the effect of a VER.
The focus here is on auction quotas rather than VERS, the exposition differs from theirs, and I do not assume that demand is linear. I am grateful to them for allowing me access to their manuscript.
10.5cc Eaton and Grossman (1986) for a discussion of the role of the strategic variable.
11.Although, for convenience, the Figures, 1, 3 lS.As expected, p rises with c but falls with a and t so that as goods get better substitutes or demand for services gets more elastic, prices fall.
p also falls with n if a tic. Also. a(n-l) + t must be positive for p to be positive.
16.Note that goods could be substitutes or complements for each other as A!. = in the symmetric equilibrium. If a > c, goods are substitutes, 6pJ x' n while if a < t they are complements.
11.Wotice that if a is small relative to n, V becomes negative so that any quota gives a zero license price and quotas are always harmful.
l8.They could be foreign ones that are Dot subject to a quota as would be the case with country specific quotas such as the voluntary export restraints on automobiles in 1981, aimed at Japan.
19.We are considering a Bertrand Nash equilibrium with differentiated products both for convenience and because price competition is regarded as more intense than quantity competition, so that the effect of having competitors who are not subject to a quota will be greater here. 
